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Abstract
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship between accounting conservatism,
corporate governance and political connection in listed firms in Malaysia where political influence plays a
significant role in the capital market and in many business dealings.
Design/methodology/approach – By utilizing 824 firm-year observations comprising large listed companies
over a period of four years from 2004, this study uses ordinary least squares regression models to investigate the
relationship between accounting conservatism, corporate governance and political connections in Malaysia.
Multiple measures of conservatism developed by Basu (1997) and Khan and Watts (2009) are employed.
Findings – The results show evidence of accounting conservatism (bad news being recognized earlier than
good news) in Malaysia. Further, the results reveal that better corporate governance structure in terms of
board independence is positively associated with accounting conservatism while management ownership is
negatively associated with it. However, political connection has a negative moderating effect on the positive
relationship between accounting conservatism and board independence. The results also suggest political
connections have a positive association with firm’s future performance.
Originality/value – This study is the first in investigating the effect of political connections on accounting
conservatism in Malaysian context and how political connections negatively affect the monitoring role of the
corporate boards. By directly measuring political connection and controlling for various corporate governance
mechanisms and firm-specific attributes, this study contributes to enhance the authors’ understanding of the
political influence in financial reporting quality and firm performance in an emerging market setting.
Keywords Corporate governance, Malaysia, Accounting conservatism, Political connection
Paper type Research paper
1. Introduction
Accounting conservatism is an important feature of quality financial information because it
enhances the reliability of financial statements by facilitating effective monitoring of
managers and contracts as part of corporate governance mechanisms (Ball et al., 2000;
Ball, 2001; Watts, 2003; Ball and Shivakumar, 2005; Basu, 2005). Evidence has shown a
direct association between strong corporate governance mechanisms and the
implementation of conservative accounting policies (Beekes et al., 2004; Ahmed and
Duellman, 2007; García Lara et al., 2007, 2009; LaFond and Roychowdhury, 2008; Ahmed
and Henry, 2011). However, recent studies have also indicated that politically connected
firms and boards with politically connected directors affect the effectiveness of corporate
governance adversely due to more agency problems thus negatively affect accounting
conservatism ( Johnson and Mitton, 2003; Faccio, 2006; Gul, 2006).
Political connections are still an important factor, particularly in emerging economies[1]
such as in Malaysia where resource allocation is heavily influenced by politics (La Porta
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et al., 2002). Political connections can be perceived as a weak form of corporate governance
because agency costs will increase at the expense of public merit (Goldman et al., 2009) since
politically connected firms enjoy substantial economic benefits. Therefore, on average, they
gain from political ties and subsequently simply care less about corporate governance
issues and the quality of the information they disclose. This will, however, result in lower
earnings quality (as measured by accruals) (Chaney et al., 2011). Although prior studies
suggest a positive relationship between accounting conservatism and the effectiveness of
corporate governance, the issue of how politically connected directors on the corporate
boards affect accounting conservatism is worth exploring.
We investigate the relationship between accounting conservatism, corporate governance
and political connections by employing a large sample of publicly listed companies in
Malaysia where political influence is embedded in corporate operations and is
institutionalized through government policies. For example, the New Economic Policy
(NEP) of 1971, implemented in Malaysia to redistribute economic wealth, resulted in a policy
of favoritism for Bumiputera-Malays[2] over other ethnic groups. With the NEP,
Bumiputeras are given preferential treatment by government through privileges, benefits
and subsidies in getting involved in politics and business activities which facilitated
political connections between government officials, business people and political parties,
specifically the United Malays National Organization (UMNO). UMNO has been in power
since independence (Gomez and Jomo, 1997; Johnson and Mitton, 2003).
The motivation for us in choosing Malaysia as the research subject is because the
institutional setting of Malaysia wields substantial political influence and clear divisional
ethnic lines. Rapid globalization in the capital market demands high-quality financial
information even in emerging economies. Examining the issue of accounting conservatism
in Malaysia is important because high-quality financial statements are essential to boost
investors’ confidence and facilitate the country’s fast-growing capital market and economy.
This paper explores corporate governance characteristics in a relationship-based[3]
economy where dependence on resource providers such as government or politicians is a
common practice. The practice of using political influence in firms is the norm in many
emerging countries as prior literature has demonstrated that political influence is a tool that
can enhance firms’ performance (Goldman et al., 2009, 2013). Consequently, having a close
connection with politicians alleviates any difficulties in accessing resources, but reduces the
demand for good quality reporting (Chaney et al., 2011). Hence, the unique context of
Malaysia motivates this paper to examine whether there is a strong association between
western corporate governance systems and accounting conservatism side-by-side with the
reality of substantial political influence. In this study, accounting conservatism is proxied
by asymmetric timeliness measure (also known as conditional conservatism) (Basu, 1997),
modified by Roychowdhury and Watts (2007) as the primary measure of accounting
conservatism[4]. Basu (1997) defines accounting conservatism as a concept where
accountants tend to require a higher degree of verification for recognizing good news
relative to bad news in earnings. Utilizing 824 firm-year observations drawn from listed
firms on the Bursa Malaysia (Malaysian Stock Exchange) over 2004-2007, we find evidence
of accounting conservatism in Malaysia. We find a strong association between accounting
conservatism and the dimensions of independence and management ownership. However,
no such association has been found to exist with the board and audit committee size
dimension, audit quality dimension and government ownership. Political dimension as an
aggregate measure is not associated with accounting conservatism but further analysis of
the associations between accounting conservatism and the specific measures of political
influence dimension demonstrates some meaningful results. When dividing political
influence into two different measures, a negative association is found between the
proportion of politically connected directors on the board and accounting conservatism.
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However, the proportion of Bumiputera-Malay directors on the board is unrelated to
accounting conservatism.
The finding of this study is important as it shows the effect of political influence in shaping
financial reporting in an environment in which political influence is institutionalized.
Additionally, using agency theory and resource dependency theory to examine an emerging
economy, this study contributes to our understanding of the roles of corporate governance
and political connections in accounting conservatism. The remainder of this study is
organized as follows: a discussion of Malaysia’s institutional background is presented in
Section 2; Section 3 discusses the theoretical framework and hypothesis development that
form the basis for developing the empirical model; Section 4 presents the research methods;
Section 5 discusses the descriptive statistics and correlation analysis; Section 6 analyzes and
discusses the results; and Section 7 concludes the study.
2. Institutional background
Malaysian politics are heavily dominated by one main ethnic group (the Malays) while
socio-economic activities are dominated by another ethnicity (the Chinese) ( Jomo and Hui,
2003; Tamam, 2009). The ethnic divisions in Malaysia led the government to launch the NEP
in 1971 with the intention of enhancing economic stabilization, addressing the income
disparities that existed between the people of various races, and bringing about social
harmony[5]. The policy resulted in close relationships between politicians and corporations
in Malaysia, and this had an impact on economic and accounting outcomes (Gomez and
Jomo, 1997; Johnson and Mitton, 2003; Gul, 2006). Firms that are subject to greater political
influence are perceived to have poorer corporate governance practices and suffer from
severe agency problems (Gomez and Jomo, 1997; Johnson and Mitton, 2003).
The government policy of protecting one ethnicity against other ethnicities in business
and economic dealings is also believed to result in different accounting practices (Ball et al.,
2003), thereby impacting on accounting quality in financial statements.
Despite the institutional differences between Asian markets and markets with more
dispersed shareholdings such as in the USA or the UK, the Asian financial crisis of
1997-1998 proves this region also suffered from agency conflicts, which demonstrated the
need for monitoring mechanisms even in a high ownership concentration environment.
Examples of high profile cases of misconduct in Malaysia during the crisis are Renong,
Perwaja Steel, Technology Resources Industry and Malaysian Airlines. As a response to the
Asian financial crisis, the Malaysian Government introduced governance reforms in order to
regain investors’ confidence. In 2001, the Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance was
included in the revised Bursa Malaysia Listing Requirements[6]. The Malaysian Code on
Corporate Governance was based on the Cadbury (1992) Report and Hampel (1998) Report
in the UK (FCCG, 2000). Despite mimicking the western corporate governance system,
Zhang (2009) contends that the Malaysian capital markets have not converged with the
Anglo-American model and have instead diverged significantly due to political influence. In
addition, Ball et al. (2003) suggest that the extent of political influence may be a factor
contributing to the poor quality of financial reporting in Malaysia, despite complying with
International Accounting Standards (IASs) (later, the International Financial Reporting
Standards (IFRS)). Based on the above arguments, examining the issue of accounting
conservatism as a feature of quality financial statements in the Malaysian context is
potentially useful.
3. Theoretical framework and hypothesis development
Managerial opportunistic behavior due to agency conflicts, arises as a result of the
separation of management and ownership ( Jensen and Meckling, 1976). While the
290
ARA
25,2
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 X
i'a
n 
Jia
ot
on
g-
Li
ve
rp
oo
l U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 A
t 1
9:
09
 0
1 
M
ar
ch
 2
01
8 
(P
T)
ownership structure in Malaysia and many other emerging countries is concentrated, Berle
and Means’ (1932) and Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) notions of agency conflicts as a result of
separation of ownership and management are still applicable (Liew, 2007). However, agency
conflicts occur more between the principal-controlling shareholders and minority
shareholders, which is known as a type 2 agency problem (Morck et al., 2005).
Agency conflicts manifest in numerous ways, including manipulating financial information,
conducting accounting frauds and expropriating shareholders’ wealth. As such, strong
corporate governance mechanisms are needed to mitigate the consequences of these conflicts.
Since corporate governance mechanisms require accounting numbers to be used as a tool by
boards of directors to monitor and control the system (Fama and Jensen, 1983), Basu’s (1997)
asymmetric timeliness measure of conservatism, has been argued to facilitate the contracting
and monitoring roles of accounting (Ball and Shivakumar, 2005; Beaver and Ryan, 2005)[7].
For example, by requiring a more timely recognition of bad news, conservatism helps to
identify negative net present value projects or poorly performing investments (Ball, 2001) and
avoid inappropriate distribution, thus guaranteeing that minimum resources are retained
inside the company (Gotti, 2008). Those arguments suggest that conservatism is a potentially
useful tool for directors in fulfilling their role of ratifying and monitoring key decisions.
These potential benefits of conservatism for corporate governance suggest a positive
relationship between conditional conservatism and strong corporate governance
characteristics. Since corporate governance is a mechanism for contract monitoring,
consistent with previous research, Basu’s (1997) asymmetric timeliness measure of
conditional conservatism is utilized in this research as the primary measure of
conservatism. Mora and Walker (2015) conclude that the empirical evidence from prior
research has shown that conditional conservatism has a variety of benefits including
constraining upwards accruals earnings management.
Since corporate governance standards in different countries vary due to their respective
cultural values, and political, social and historical circumstances, political influence is
another dimension of corporate governance worth exploring. Some prior research employs
resource dependency theory in conjunction with agency theory to explain corporate
governance structure beyond the monitoring roles (Hillman et al., 2000; Udayasankar and
Das, 2007). The integration of the agency and resource dependency theories is appropriate
for helping us understand what contributes to the provision of resources and effective
monitoring because in practice, boards of directors have two roles: first, to monitor firms’
performance; and second, provide resources for them (Korn and Ferry, 1999). The agency
theory suggests that accounting conservatism should be positively correlated with better
corporate governance characteristics because firms with strong corporate governance
characteristics will demand higher conservatism, thus mitigating the agency problem (Watts,
2003). In contrast, firms with more management and government ownership have less demand
for accounting conservatism since manager and government interests are more aligned in
firms (Beekes et al., 2004; Bushman and Piotroski, 2006; LaFond and Roychowdhury, 2008).
With regard to corporate governance, resource dependency theory focuses on the role
that directors play in providing or securing essential resources for an organization through
their connections with the external environment (such as resource providers), which place
the firm in a competitive advantage position (Hillman et al., 2000). Resource dependency
theory also explains how reliance on resource providers (e.g. in this case, politically
connected directors, government-owned firms and Bumiputera-Malay-owned firms) results
in government or politicians exerting influence on firms’ decision making (Pfeffer and
Salancik, 1978), including the outcomes in financial reporting. One example of such
influence, suggested by Ball et al. (2003), is that the government of Malaysia prohibited the
reporting of losses during recessions. The delay in reporting losses is one such less
conservative approach as defined by the asymmetric timeliness of earnings. Differential in the
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level of accounting conservatism may emerge due to the existence of two forms of political
favoritism in Malaysia: the official status awarded to firms that are run by Bumiputeras; and
the close relationship between firms and politicians and the fact these firms are run by both
Bumiputeras and Chinese business people (Gomez and Jomo, 1997; Johnson and Mitton, 2003).
Accordingly, the political influence dimension in this study is proxied by two attributes: the
proportion of politically connected directors on the board (a direct measure); and the proportion
of Bumiputera-Malays on the board of directors (an indirect measure).
Prior studies on accounting conservatism and corporate governance such as Beekes et al.
(2004), Ahmed and Duellman (2007) and García Lara et al. (2007) emphasize the importance
of the board of directors in the role of corporate governance monitoring. In studying the
US market, García Lara et al. (2009) incorporate several internal and external characteristics
of corporate governance, where some characteristics might not be relevant in the emerging
market of Malaysia. Ahmed and Henry (2011) examine the role of board composition, board
size and voluntary formation of a board audit committee as important agency and
governance attributes in accounting conservatism of listed firms in Australia. Beekes et al.
(2004) and LaFond and Roychowdhury (2008) document the negative impact of
management ownership on accounting conservatism. While most prior studies focus on
the role of board of directors and ownership structure in more dispersed shareholdings
markets, we select variables for governance structure, governance composition, external
auditors and ownership in addition to variables from the political influence dimension above.
Previous studies found that the components of governance mechanisms have the most
profound effect on the quality of financial reporting (Cohen et al., 2004). The variables are board
size, board independence, the chief executive officer (CEO) duality, audit committee size, audit
committee expertise, audit committee independence, the presence or absence of the “Big
auditors”, and provision of non-audit fees (Cohen et al., 2004; Beekes et al., 2004; Ahmed and
Duellman, 2007; García Lara et al., 2007, 2009; Ahmed and Henry, 2011).
The use of Basu’s (1997) model of asymmetric timeliness involves interactions with bad
news and good news and this restricts the inclusion of too many variables in the model
specification. Therefore, following Larcker et al. (2007), principal component analysis (PCA) has
been undertaken to reduce these ten governance variables down to four dimensions, consisting
of board and audit committee size, independence, audit quality and the extent of political
influence. Another important institutional factor in Malaysia that differs from the developed
countries is the high ownership concentration in the hands of managers and government
(Tam and Tan, 2007). Since ownership structure affects agency conflicts, it is another
important factor to be examined with reference to accounting conservatism (Beekes et al., 2004;
LaFond and Roychowdhury, 2008). Hence, management ownership and government
ownership are controlled when estimating the models in order to obtain more reliable
estimations. The following sections explain the hypotheses, presented in accordance with the
PCA classification of internal governance variables, then followed by ownership structure.
3.1 Board and audit committee size
Size is an important dimension of governance that captures the board and audit committee’s
resource potential. The results from PCA demonstrate that board size and audit committee
size fall under the same size dimension. Since more resources are devoted to large board and
audit committee, these increase their knowledge base allowing directors to specialize more
and provide better monitoring and control financial statements (Anderson et al., 2004; Ahmed
and Duellman, 2007). Furthermore, Kalbers and Fogarty (1998) suggest that larger audit
committees have greater authority and receive more meaningful support from the board of
directors, and their activities are thus more likely to be recognized by external auditors and
internal auditors. The studies by Malaysian researchers document a significant positive
relationship between board size and corporate performance (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006)
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and corporate governance statements (Amran et al., 2010). However, some prior studies have
also shown that small boards are more effective. For example, Ahmed et al. (2006) demonstrate
a significant negative relationship exists between board size and earnings quality. Smaller
boards and audit committees are more effective monitors because they have a higher degree of
membership coordination which could reduce the following: communication difficulties,
information costs and incidence of severe free-rider problems ( Jensen, 1993; Hermalin and
Weisbach, 2003; Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005). Some Malaysian studies even reveal
insignificant results in relation to audit committee size and reporting quality (Rahman and
Ali, 2006; Saleh et al., 2007).
Indeed, there are two competing views of size and the evidence from prior literature is
inconclusive. However, due to difficulties in coordinating large boards, evidence from prior
literature seems to support the contention that small boards are more effective than large
boards. Accordingly:
H1a. Accounting conservatism is negatively associated with the board and audit
committee size dimension of corporate governance.
3.2 Independence
Independence is another important dimension in corporate governance which is strongly
supported by agency theory. Results from PCA demonstrate that variables of board
independence composition, audit committee independence and CEO duality fall under this
category. The agency theory postulates that independent directors are needed on
companies’ boards to monitor and control the actions of managers (Fama and Jensen, 1983).
The importance of an independent audit committee is emphasized by the High Level
Finance Committee on Corporate Governance (HLFC) (2000) in Malaysia. The independent
audit committee provides a means of reviewing a company’s procedures in preparing
financial statements, its internal controls and the independence of the company’s external
auditors and a forum for dialogue with the company’s external and internal auditors (Liew,
2007). Similarly, it is recommended that the role of the chairman be separated from that of
CEO to make the board more independent, and reduce the potential for management having
too much power over daily business operations ( Jensen, 1993).
The importance of board independence is documented by Beekes et al. (2004) and
Ahmed and Duellman (2007), who find that having more independent directors on a board
is linked to a higher level of accounting conservatism. A significant negative relationship
is found between audit committee independence and abnormal working capital accruals
when using data from Singapore and Malaysia (Bradbury et al., 2006), suggesting that
monitoring effectiveness is affected by the extent of the independence of the audit
committee members. Prior studies have shown that separating CEO and chairman is an
effective tool for board monitoring (Beasley, 1996); evidence from Malaysia shows that the
separation of CEO and chairman does improve earnings quality (Saleh et al., 2005).
In contrast, Haniffa and Cooke (2002), Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) and Rahman and
Ali (2006) find results contradictory to prediction in agency theory. Rahman and Ali (2006)
contend that the insignificant role of independent directors on boards in Malaysia could be
due to a lack of knowledge about company affairs which has led to management
dominance over board matters.
Overall, the independence dimension plays an important role in terms of helping to
uphold the integrity and credibility of published financial statements which is expected
to result in higher accounting conservatism in financial reporting. The hypothesis is written
as follows:
H1b. Accounting conservatism is positively associated with the independence dimension
of corporate governance.
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3.3 Effectiveness of auditing functions (audit quality)
The quality of auditing might be another possible explanation for accounting conservatism
in Malaysia. Results from PCA reveal that audit committee expertise, the Big Four auditors
and the provision of non-audit fees fall under this dimension. The Malaysian Code on
Corporate Governance requires at least one member of the audit committee to be a member
of the Malaysian Institute of Accountants or to have not less than three years’ accounting
experience and to have passed the professional examination. Krishnan and Visvanathan
(2008) find that the degree of accounting expertise on audit committees is positively
related to unconditional accounting conservatism. Other studies document a negative
correlation between accounting financial expertise and various internal control problems
(Krishnan, 2005; Hoitash et al., 2009). In Malaysia, the financial expertise of audit committee
members is found to be associated with high quality of financial reporting (Rahman and
Ali, 2006; Saleh et al., 2007).
Big Four[8] auditors have been used as the proxy for audit quality in many studies.
Prior analyses have shown that the use of high-quality external auditors, proxied by the
“Big Five or Four”, are negatively correlated with the levels of abnormal accruals (Francis
et al., 1999) and with the incidence of accounting errors (DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1991).
Basu (2001) suggests that the globalization of auditing has resulted in the extension of
auditing practices internationally. “Big Four” accounting firms audit most large firms in
Malaysia, and they are more likely to enforce a greater level of asymmetric conservatism in
these firms because of their reputation. In Malaysia, it is common practice that reputable
(then Big Six) auditors also provide non-audit services and this trend is likely to increase
(Teoh and Lim, 1996). Empirical evidence seems to be mixed on whether non-audit fees
affect audit quality. Gul et al. (2006) have documented there is a negative association
between the provision of non-audit services and value relevance of earnings, suggesting
that providing non-audit services compromises an auditor’s independence. However, other
studies (Simunic, 1984; DeFond et al., 2002; Ashbaugh et al., 2003) have found little evidence
that the receipt of non-audit fees jeopardizes an auditor’s independence. Ruddock et al.
(2006) also found that a higher provision of non-audit services has no impact on accounting
conservatism.
In general, the arguments above seem to support the contention that better audit quality
will demand higher accounting conservatism. Therefore, the hypothesis is stated as follows:
H1c. Accounting conservatism is positively associated with the audit quality dimension
of corporate governance.
3.4 Political influence
As previously explained in the theoretical framework, political influence is proxied by the
proportion of politically connected directors and the proportion of Bumiputera-Malay
directors. The proxies are consistent with the results derived from PCA. Resource
dependency explains how connections with political leaders affect firms’ decision making
(Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Politically connected firms are more likely to manipulate
reported financial performance statistics in order to minimize the political costs due to
adverse or damaging news (Shleifer and Vishny, 1994). The negative influence of political
connection on auditing and reporting quality is further evidenced, respectively, by Gul’s
(2006) Malaysian study and Chaney et al.’s (2011) cross-country study. Gul (2006) documents
higher audit fees for firms with political connections due to the greater likelihood of business
failure, misreporting, overstatement of earnings. Further, Chaney et al. (2011) find that firms
with political connections do not only have poor quality of reporting but also suffer less
negative consequences as a result of it. Additionally, How et al. (2014) contend that
managers of politically connected firms tend to practice greater discretion in disclosing
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financial information, and thereby contributing to the manipulation of media releases.
Since accounting conservatism relates to the release of good or bad news, consistent with
the arguments above, political connections lead to less accounting conservatism.
The proportion of politically connected directors on a company or corporation board is
used as the first proxy for political influence.
The government’s efforts to increase the participation by Malays and other indigenous
groups in the national economy have brought these politically favored ethnic groups, i.e.
the Bumiputeras, into the capital markets (Ahmad et al., 2006). Firms with more
Bumiputera-Malay directors are mostly either Bumiputera conglomerates or government
owned. Bumiputera-Malay firms are able to obtain easy credit facilities from banks and
Bumiputera trust agencies under the direction of the UMNO, which was created to acquire
shares for Bumiputera-Malays (Mehmet, 1988).
Bumiputera-controlled firms (i.e. politically favored firms) and politically connected firms
are perceived as having poor corporate governance practices and greater agency problems
because these businesses rely heavily on the government; there is less difficulty in obtaining
resources should they run into financial trouble ( Johnson and Mitton, 2003; Gomez and
Jomo, 1997; Chen et al., 2010) and thereby demanding less accounting conservatism in their
financial statements. Less incentive to report losses in a timely fashion is also motivated by
the fact that this ethnic group suffers less political fall-out from reporting large profits
because they are protected by the government (Ball et al., 2003).
The arguments outlined above suggest that political influence would be negatively
associated with accounting conservatism. Accordingly, the hypothesis is stated as follows:
H2a. Accounting conservatism is negatively associated with the political influence
dimension.
H2b. Accounting conservatism is negatively associated with the proportion of politically
connected directors on board.
H2c. Accounting conservatism is negatively associated with the proportion of
Bumiputera-Malay directors on the board.
3.5 Ownership structure
Government and the management dominance in corporate ownership structure are typical
of Malaysian businesses. Ownership structure has a significant influence on the quality of
reporting. According to Jensen (1993), managers have strong incentives to perform if they
have significant equity stakes in the firm (known as the alignment effect). However, it has
been claimed that a high level of concentrated ownership leads to poorer performance and
equally poor reporting quality due to the dominance of insiders (known as the entrenchment
effect) (Morck et al., 1988; Jiang and Kim, 2000).
Beekes et al. (2004) find no evidence of an increase in accounting quality in firms with
greater managerial share ownership. This finding is supported by recent evidence in
LaFond and Roychowdhury (2008), which documents a negative association between
asymmetric timeliness and management ownership. They argue that since accounting
conservatism is a tool to address agency problems, greater accounting conservatism is
demanded when the interests of managers and shareholders are less aligned. Since these
firms are less subject to governance by their boards of directors and discipline by market for
corporate control (Fan andWong, 2002), businesses with higher management ownership are
more likely to adopt less conservative accounting practices. Accordingly, the hypothesis is
stated as follows:
H3a. Accounting conservatism is negatively associated with the proportion of
management ownership.
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The resource dependency theory explains how ownership by government allows it to exert
control over management appointments, incentives and major economic decision making
(Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). It will affect what is reported in financial statements (Ball et al.,
2003). This is evidenced by prior studies which have shown that firms with a higher degree
of government share ownership are associated with a lower level of financial transparency
and that they push for the early recognition of good news (Bushman et al., 2004; Bushman
and Piotroski, 2006). Further, Fan and Wong (2002) find firms with high ownership
concentration which include those with substantial government ownership manipulate
earnings; in fact their earnings are less informative. Based on the arguments above,
the hypothesis is stated as follows:
H3b. Accounting conservatism is negatively associated with the percentage of
government ownership.
In summary, we test three hypotheses in this paper. H1 looks at the effect of internal
governance on accounting conservatism, H2 examines the effect of political influence on
conservatism andH3 explores the effect of government ownership on conservatism. We test
these hypotheses in the Malaysian setting because it is significantly different to developed
economies, e.g. the USA. In Malaysia there is blatant favoritism for Bumiputera-Malays over
the other ethnic groups, strong political connections between directors of listed firms and
politicians, and significant government ownership. We will investigate whether
western-style corporate governance can still be effective and efficient in such a unique
institutional setting. Prior studies have established a link between governance and
conservatism (Beekes et al., 2004; Ahmed and Duellman, 2007; García Lara et al., 2007). The
main issue in our paper is the role played by political connections. We view this new variable
as a form of weak governance and expect it has a negative impact on accounting conservatism.
4. Research methods
The sample for this study consists of 206 firms, with the fiscal years 2004-2007 being
selected. These firms were chosen based on the firms having the top market capitalization in
2007. Large firms have been chosen because according to Roe (2003), these firms are more
likely to be affected by political factors. The years 2004-2007[9] have been chosen in order to
examine the impact of the code a few years after the incorporation of the code of corporate
governance into the Bursa Malaysia Listing Requirements (2001). The selection period is
consistent with Ahmed and Duellman (2007), who examine the period after a formal
corporate governance framework was introduced. Further, training and education about,
and general exposure to corporate governance since it was first implemented, may result in
some variations concerning the effectiveness of corporate governance within firms.
The impact of convergence with IASs in Malaysia in 2005 is minimal as the previously
known MASB[10] were mostly borrowed from IASs and renamed IFRS (Lazar et al., 2005).
The revised Basu (1997) model accumulates the profits backwards for three years, thus
going back to the year 2002, being the year immediately after the code of corporate
governance was introduced. The period from 2004 to 2007 also represents a period of
economic and political stability for Malaysia. The corporate governance and political
influence data from 2004 to 2007 were hand-collected from the annual reports of the firms
concerned. The financial data and the annual reports were extracted from the OSIRIS
database. Table I Panel A presents a summary of how the final sample was obtained. In
order to generate the complete set of data for about 200 firms each year, a list of 350 firms
was initially obtained from the OSIRIS database, which comprises the top 500 firms in 2007
based on market capitalization. Totally, 24 firms in the financial services and insurance
sector were eliminated from the list due to differences in the requirements relating to their
financial statements. Furthermore, 15 firms were eliminated due to changes in their
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accounting years. Additionally, 105 firms were eliminated due to missing data or annual
reports in the OSIRIS database. This left a final sample of 206 firms for the years 2004-2007
including 824 firm-year observations. Table I Panel B presents the industry breakdown of
the sample firms. These industry classifications are based on the Bursa Malaysia
(Malaysian Stock Exchange) guideline. The industry distribution in our sample is similar to
that of the population of listed firms on the Bursa Malaysia.
4.1 Measures of accounting conservatism and independent variables
In measuring the asymmetric timeliness of earnings, Basu (1997) uses a reverse regression
of returns and earnings, whereby the dependent variable, namely, earnings per share, is
regressed on a dummy variable indicator scheme using 1, if the return is negative, and
0 otherwise, a return variable and an interacting variable between the dummy and the
return[11]. The stock price return is used as a proxy for good or bad news incorporated
in earnings. The coefficient on stock returns ( β2) measures the sensitivity of earnings to
positive stock returns (a proxy for economic gains). A positive coefficient ( β3) on the return
interacting with the dummy variable indicates accounting conservatism. This coefficient
measures the incremental sensitivity of earnings to the incorporation of bad news relative
to good news.
According to Roychowdhury and Watts (2007), if the reverse regression of the returns
model uses a single period returns and earnings, the coefficient ( β3) reflects asymmetric
timeliness of earnings with respect to news arrival within that one period only,
which implies only the asymmetric verification standards. Roychowdhury and Watts
(2007) suggest that for the coefficient ( β3) to be better at measuring aggregate
conservatism, this will entail accumulating the effect of asymmetric timeliness across
all prior periods. Following the approach suggested by them and used by Ahmed
and Duellman (2007), returns and earnings are accumulated over the three years in our
study. Earnings are deflated by the market value of equity at the beginning of the
period to control for heteroscedasticity. The basic model used in this study is stated
below. The following equation is then interacted with other independent variables to
Panel A: sample selection
List of 350 firms in OSIRIS top 500, 2007
Market capitalization 350
Financial services and insurance 24
Change of accounting year 15
Missing data or annual reports 105
Final sample 206
Panel B: sample breakdown based on industry
Bursa Malaysia industry classification No. of firms
Consumer products 42
Industrial products 56
Construction 17
Trading/Services 41
IPC 5
Technology 3
Hotels 3
Properties 16
Plantations 23
Total sample 206
Yearsa 4
Total firm-year observations 824
Table I.
Sample in the analysis
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examine the relationship between those factors and accounting conservatism.
Accordingly, this relationship is modeled as:
Et;tj
Pt;tj1
¼ a0þb1Dt;tjþb2Rt;tjþb3Dt;tj  Rt;tjþe; (1)
where Et,t−j is income before extraordinary items cumulative from year t−j to year t, and j
is equal to 2, Pt,t−1 is the market value of equity at the beginning of the year t−j, Rt,t−j is the
accumulated annual returns of year t−j to year t (calculated annually from the price
starting four months after the end of the fiscal year t−j−1 and ending four months after
the end of year t), Dt,t−j is a dummy variable indicator equal to 1, if the return is negative,
and 0 otherwise, Dt,t−j×Rt,t−j is an interaction variable consisting of the firm’s stock
return and return dummy variable. This coefficient captures the response of bad news
compared to good news. A positive coefficient represents conservative financial reporting.
The corporate governance, political influence and ownership structure variables are
measured as follows. Board size denoted as BSIZE is measured as the total number of board
members. ACSIZE represents audit committee size measured by the total number of audit
committee members. Board independence denoted as BIND is measured as the proportion of
independent directors to the total number of directors on the board. ACIND represents audit
committee independence measured by the proportion of independent audit committee
members to the total number of audit committee members. CEO/chair separation is referred
to as CEODUALITY and coded as 1 if the positions of CEO and chairman are occupied by
different persons and 0 otherwise. ACEXPERT which refers to audit committee financial
expertise, is measured as the ratio of an audit committee of financial expertise to total audit
committee members (ACSIZE). The definition of an audit committee expertise follows
the Bursa Malaysia Listing Requirements (2001). Firms’ financial reports audited by the
“Big Four” audit firms are coded 1, and those audited by “non-Big Four” firms are coded 0,
and this variable is called BIG4. We also include the ratio of non-audit fees to total audit fees
as NAF in the model.
POLCON is the ratio of politically connected directors to the total number of directors on
the company board. A politically connected director may be a member of parliament,
a minister, a head of state or a state assemblyman (Chaney et al., 2011) or a person who is
either currently or was formerly a government bureaucrat (Agrawal and Knoeber, 2001;
Fan et al., 2007). Following Fan et al. (2007), data about politically connected directors were
obtained by reviewing the profiles of relevant directors in the company’s annual report,
based on the definition mentioned before. In addition, the list of cabinet members and
parliamentarians and state legislators were also reviewed (www.pilihanraya.com.my/
melayu/parliamentlist.asp). MALDIR represents the proportion of Bumiputera-Malay
directors to total number of directors. The proportion of management ownership
(MAGTOWN) is measured as the number of ordinary shares held by non-independent
directors divided by the total number of ordinary shares. The government ownership
percentage (GOVOWN) is the proportion of government shareholdings in the number of
ordinary shares held by 30 largest shareholders. The government shareholdings are proxied
as the number of ordinary shares held by Khazanah Nasional, Employee Provident Funds,
Lembaga Tabung Haji, Lembaga Tabung Angkatan Tentera, Permodalan Nasional Berhad,
State Economic Corporation Development, Ministry of Finance Incorporated, Felda, Felcra,
Pertubuhan Keselamatan Sosial (PERKESO) and other government agencies[12].
While Beekes et al. (2004), Ahmed and Duellman (2007) and Ahmed and Henry (2011)
assume the nature of corporate governance characteristics exogenously, García Lara et al.
(2007, 2009) build an aggregate index that combines several characteristics of corporate
governance. A methodology in this study which differs from the abovementioned studies is
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the application of PCA to reduce the number of independent variables into a few coherent
and uncorrelated factors (Dey, 2008; Larcker et al., 2007). This technique accounts for most
of the variance in the observed variables in determining which of them are associated with
each of the reduced factors. Following prior studies, this study uses a mixture of metric and
non-metric measurements in performing the factor analysis.
4.2 PCA and the empirical model
In our PCA, all factors with an eigenvalue greater than unity are retained for subsequent
analysis. This procedure results in four factors that retain about 57 percent of the total
variance of the original data (Table II: Panel A). Panel B depicts an unrotated component
analysis factor matrix. This reduced solution is then rotated by using an orthogonal rotation
Panel A: results from the extraction of components factors
Initial eigenvalues
Component Total Proportion of variance Cumulative proportion
1.000 1.843 0.184 0.184
2.000 1.521 0.152 0.336
3.000 1.261 0.126 0.463
4.000 1.095 0.110 0.572
Panel B: unrotated component analysis factor matrix
Components
Variables 1 2 3 4
BSIZE −0.097 0.630 0.178 −0.091
CEODUALITY 0.138 0.125 0.226 0.603
BIND 0.467 −0.151 −0.266 0.196
ACSIZE 0.054 0.586 −0.165 −0.121
ACIND 0.237 0.179 0.121 0.627
ACEXPERT 0.119 −0.401 0.381 −0.035
BIG4 0.196 −0.022 0.536 −0.236
NAF 0.172 0.139 0.571 −0.156
POLCON 0.539 0.090 −0.191 −0.219
MALDIR 0.568 0.035 −0.098 −0.230
Panel C: rotated (orthogonal varimax ) component analysis factor matrix
AUDQ INDEP POLINF BACSIZE
BSIZE 0.149 −0.032 −0.025 0.693
CEODUALITY 0.170 0.432 −0.101 0.068
BIND −0.236 0.532 0.271 −0.268
ACSIZE −0.235 0.114 0.123 0.553
ACIND 0.074 0.716 −0.112 0.092
ACEXPERT 0.433 −0.012 −0.005 −0.324
BIG4 0.550 0.039 0.067 0.006
NAF 0.575 0.030 0.064 0.147
POLCON −0.030 −0.031 0.656 0.049
MALDIR 0.104 −0.029 0.670 −0.006
Notes: BIND is the proportion of independent directors divided by the total number of directors on the board;
BSIZE is the total number of directors; CEODUALITY is a dummy variable whereby 1 signifies that the
positions of CEO and chairman of the board are occupied by different directors and 0 signifies otherwise;
ACIND is the number of independent audit committee members divided by the total number of audit
committee members; ACSIZE is the total number of audit committee members; ACEXPERT is the number of
audit committee members who possess financial expertise divided by the total number of audit committee
members; BIG4 is a dummy variable whereby 1 signifies “Big Four” auditors and 0 signifies otherwise;
NAF is the ratio of the amount of non-audit fees to total fees; POLCON is the proportion of politically
connected directors on the board; and MALDIR is the proportion of Bumiputera-Malay directors on the board
Table II.
Principal component
analysis
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in order to enhance the interpretability of the PCA solution. The rotated matrix solution is
depicted in Panel C. Each of the retained components of the rotated solution is interpreted by
identifying the variables with high loadings in each given component, and by determining
what these in common variables have. Each factor (or index) named is based on the
characteristics of the indicators. It is considered to be high if its absolute loading exceeds
0.40 (Larcker et al., 2007). Factor (1) is called AUDQ and this captures the audit quality
dimension, with ACEXPERT, BIG4 and NAF having a positive loading on this dimension.
Factor (2) is known as INDEP and this represents an independence dimension, with BIND,
ACIND and CEODUALITY having a positive loading on this dimension. Factor (3) is called
POLINF and this represents the political influence dimension, with POLCON, and MALDIR
having a positive loading on this dimension. Finally, factor (4) is referred to as BACSIZE
and this represents the size of the board and audit committee, with BSIZE and ACSIZE
having a positive loading on this dimension.
Following Larcker et al. (2007), the factor-based scores are computed as the average
equal-weighted sum of the standardized variables associated within each factor. The factor-
based scores derived from these four dimensions are used in the ordinary least square (OLS)
regression so that the relationship between accounting conservatism and corporate
governance can be ascertained. These four new dimensional variables and the ownership
structure variables are employed in the subsequent empirical model. The regression is then
repeated to observe the effect of each political influence measure. The model based on Basu
(1997), and modified by (Roychowdhury andWatts, 2007) and (Ahmed and Duellman, 2007)[13]
is presented below:
Ei;tj
Pt;tj1
¼ a0þb1Dt;tjþb2Rt;tjþb3Dt;tj  Rt;tjþ
X3
i¼1
b CGð Þi;t  Dt;tj
þ
X3
i¼1
b CGð Þi;t  Rt;tj þ
X3
i¼1
b CGð Þi;t  Dt;tj  Rt;tjþb0;polPOLi;t
þb1;polPOLi;t  Dt;tjþb2;pol POLi;t  Rt;tjþb3;polPOLi;t  Dt;t1  Rt;tj
þ
X2
i¼1
b OWNð Þi;tþ
X2
i¼1
b OWNð Þi;t  Dt;tjþ
X2
i¼1
b OWNð Þi;t  Rt;tj
þ
X2
i¼1
b OWNð Þi;t  Dt;tj  Rt;tjþ other control variablesð Þþe; (2)
where corporate governance (CG) variables are BACSIZE, AUDQ and INDEP. BACSIZE is the
average equal-weighted sum of the standardized BSIZE and ACSIZE, AUDQ is the average
equal-weighted sum of the standardized BIG4, ACEXPERT and NAF, INDEP is the average
equal-weighted sum of the standardized BIND, ACIND and CEODUALITY. Political (POL)
variables are POLINF, POLCON and MALDIR where POLINF is the average equal-weighted
sum of the standardized POLCON and MALDIR, POLCON is the proportion of politically
connected directors on the board, MALDIR is the proportion of Bumiputera-Malay directors
on the board. Ownership (OWN) variables are MAGTOWN and GOVOWN where
MAGTOWN is the number of ordinary shares held by non-independent directors divided by
the total number of ordinary shares, and GOVOWN is the percentage of number of ordinary
shares held by government over the total number of ordinary shares. All other variables are as
previously defined.
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Following Khan and Watts (2009), the control variables are the ratio of growth, firm size,
leverage industry and year. The variables growth, firm size and leverage are also interacted
with Dt,t−j×Rt,t−j following the approach taken in previous studies (Ahmed and Duellman,
2007; LaFond and Roychowdhury, 2008; Chen et al., 2010). Following Roychowdhury and
Watts (2007), differences in firm growth opportunities have also been controlled. This is
measured by market-to-book (MTB) ratio. A positive relationship is expected between MTB
and accounting conservatism. Firm size (FSIZE) is measured as the natural log of the
market value of equity at the end of the financial year (Khan and Watts, 2009). Khan and
Watts (2009) argue that large firms have lower information asymmetry, and therefore less
demand for conservatism. This has also been noted by Givoly et al. (2007) and LaFond and
Watts (2008), who found that the asymmetric timeliness of earnings for large firms is
significantly smaller for large firms. Therefore it is expected that firm size is negatively
associated with accounting conservatism. Leverage (LEV) is measured as the amount of
total long-term debt divided by average total assets. Highly leveraged firms experienced
more conflicts between bondholders and shareholders (Ahmed et al., 2002), and higher
agency costs (Dey, 2008). Litigation risk is not directly controlled because there is minimal
risk of litigation in Malaysia (Favere-Marchesi, 2000).
5. Descriptive statistics and correlation analysis
5.1 Descriptive statistics
Panel A of Table III presents descriptive statistics of the accounting and market variables.
Panel B presents descriptive statistics of the corporate governance variables, while Panel
C presents descriptive statistics of the four principal component factors. The mean (median)
of earnings is 0.340 (0.312) with the range being from −2.144 to 2.635. The mean (median) of
returns is 0.306 (0.368), and not skewed significantly. Panel A shows that the MTB ratio is
between 0.139 and 7.884, with the mean being 1.341, indicating the presence growth
opportunities. The natural log of market value of equity (a measure of firm size) is between
9.908 (RM20,093) and 17.262 (RM43,100,505), with the mean being 13.143 (RM1,732,328),
indicating that the sample firms are fairly large. The leverage ratio is 12.4 percent, with the
range being between 0 and 66.6 percent.
The descriptive statistics of the corporate governance variables show that the average
board size is 8.141 members, and 42.5 percent of the directors being independent. About
72.4 percent of audit committee members are independent directors, while the average audit
committee size is 3.65 members. The proportion of audit committee members with
accounting expertise is between 16.7 and 100 percent, with the average being 37.8 percent.
On average, 19.4 percent of the total fees are non-audit fees, ranging between 0 and
85.1 percent. The average percentage of politically connected directors is 22.3 percent, with
the range being 0-67 percent. Bumiputera-Malay directors comprise 43.8 percent of the total
number of directors, and this ranges between 0 and 100 percent. The mean of the percentage
of management ownership is 28.1 percent with the range between 24.1 and 87.4 percent.
The average government ownership is 11.32 percent, with the range being 0-66.99 percent,
suggesting some firms are subject to strong government influence.
On average, 88.68 percent of firms are privately owned, being either Bumiputera
conglomerates or Chinese business people. The firms with more Bumiputera-Malay
directors are those with higher government ownership and Bumiputera conglomerates.
The existence of Bumiputera-Malays on a board and in the ownership structure is a result of
the government’s political decisions. Despite the politics of favoritism, non-Bumiputera
directors (mostly Chinese) still comprise a larger proportion of the total number of directors
in the listed firms on Bursa Malaysia. Since the sample is derived from firms with large
market capitalization, most of the firms have a separate chairman and CEO (91.6 percent)
and are audited by the Big Four auditors (71.6 percent). The descriptive statistics for
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Panel A: descriptive statistics for financial statement variables
Variables Mean Median SD Minimum Maximum
E/P 0.34 0.312 0.585 −2.144 2.635
R 0.306 0.268 0.617 −1.488 2.092
MTB 1.341 0.977 1.219 0.139 7.884
FSIZE 13.143 12.979 1.376 9.908 17.262
LEV 0.124 0.074 0.141 0 0.666
Panel B: descriptive statistics for corporate governance and political influence variables
Continuous variables Mean Median SD Minimum Maximum
BSIZE 8.141 8 1.85 4 13
BIND 0.425 0.4 0.106 0.167 0.8
ACIND 0.724 0.75 0.097 0.5 1
ACSIZE 3.647 4 0.678 3 5
ACEXPERT 0.378 0.333 0.16 0.167 1
NAF 0.194 0.111 0.216 0 0.851
POLCON 0.223 0.222 0.162 0 0.857
MALDIR 0.436 0.375 0.258 0 1
MAGTOWN 0.281 0.296 0.241 0 0.874
GOVOWN 0.113 0.579 0.169 0 0.67
Dichotomous measure
No.¼ 1 No.¼ 0 Percent¼ 1 Percent¼ 0
CEODUALITY 756 68 0.916 0.084
Big Four 590 234 0.716 0.284
Panel C: descriptive statistics for principal component factors
Mean Median SD Minimum Maximum
BACSIZE 0.002 −0.051 0.816 −1.597 2.036
AUDQ −0.001 −0.05 0.648 −1.26 1.999
INDEP 0.003 −0.035 0.643 −2.029 2.229
POLINF 0 −0.137 0.865 −1.533 3.05
Notes: E/P is income before extraordinary items cumulative from year t−j to year t, and j is equal to 2 divided
by the market value of equity at the end of the year t−j. R is the buy and hold return starting four months after
the end of the fiscal year t−j−1 and ending four months after the end of year t. MTB is market-to-book ratio.
FSIZE is the natural log of market equity. LEV is the amount of total long-term debt divided by average total
assets. BSIZE is the total number of directors; BIND is the proportion of independent directors divided by the
total number of directors on the board; ACIND is the number of independent audit committee members divided
by the total number of audit committee members; ACSIZE is the total number of audit committee members;
ACEXPERT is the number of audit committee members who possess financial expertise divided by the total
number of audit committee members; NAF is the ratio of the amount of non-audit fees to total fees; POLCON is
the proportion of politically connected directors on the board; MALDIR is the proportion of Bumiputera-Malay
directors on the board; MAGTOWN is the proportion of total ordinary shares held by non-independent directors
over total shares and GOVOWN is the percentage of total number of ordinary shares held by the government
divided by the total number of ordinary shares. CEODUALITY is a dummy variable whereby 1 signifies that
the positions of CEO and chairman of the board are occupied by different directors and 0 signifies otherwise;
BIG4 is a dummy variable whereby 1 signifies “Big Four” auditors and 0 signifies otherwise. BACSIZE is the
average equal-weighted sum of standardized BSIZE and ACSIZE. AUDQ is the average equal-weighted sum of
standardized ACEXPERT, BIG4 and NAF. INDEP is the average equal-weighted sum of standardized BIND,
CEODUALITY and ACIND. POLINF is the average equal-weighted sum of standardized POLCON, and
MALDIR. BIND is the proportion of independent directors divided by the total number of directors on the board;
BSIZE is the total number of directors; CEODUALITY is a dummy variable whereby 1 signifies that the
positions of CEO and chairman of the board are occupied by different directors and 0 signifies otherwise;
ACIND is the number of independent audit committee members divided by the total number of audit committee
members; ACSIZE is the total number of audit committee members; ACEXPERT is the number of audit
committee members who possess financial expertise divided by the total number of audit committee members;
BIG4 is a dummy variable whereby 1 signifies “Big Four” auditors and 0 signifies otherwise; NAF is the ratio of
the amount of non-audit fees to total fees; POLCON is the proportion of politically connected directors on the
board; and MALDIR is the proportion of Bumiputera-Malay directors on the board
Table III.
Descriptive statistics
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principal component factors are presented in Panel C. These factors consist of the aggregate
of the standardized variables loaded into each principal component factor.
The Pearson correlation (r) (not reported) shows none of the variables are not highly
correlated with each other. Despite this, there are still concerns about collinearity when
interaction variables are involved. Therefore regression results in Table IV are based on the
centering approach for interaction variables in models (2)-(5) to reduce the variance inflation
factor (VIF). The centering approach refers to the mean (a constant) subtracted from each
variable, yielding a centered variable (Robinson and Schumacker, 2009). VIF is inspected
less than 10 for all regressions[14].
The proportion of Bumiputera-Malay directors on a board (MALDIR) is significantly
negatively correlated with earnings (E/P) (−0.076, p⩽0.05), suggesting firms run by more
Bumiputera-Malay directors perform poorly. The positive r (0.106, p⩽ 0.05) between E/P
and management ownership (MAGTOWN) and a negative r (−0.062, p⩽ 0.10) between
E/P and government ownership (GOVOWN) indicate firms with more management
ownership and less government ownership perform better. As expected, all specific political
influence variables are positively and significantly correlated with POLINF. Nevertheless,
these specific political influence variables are not tested in the same regression with the
aggregate measure of political influence (POLINF). POLCON is positively correlated with
GOVOWN and MALDIR. GOVOWN is positively correlated with MALDIR. This is not
surprising since most government-owned firms are run by Bumiputera-Malays, who also
dominate Malaysia’s political system. It is interesting to note that there are significant
positive correlations between INDEP and AUDQ, and also between INDEP and POLINF
(POLCON and MALDIR). The r¼ 0.075 between INDEP and AUDQ suggests that
independent directors are significantly associated ( po0.05) with audit quality in Malaysia.
Additionally, the findings indicate that the composition of independent directors is
significantly associated with POLINF (r¼ 0.237) in Malaysian companies. The BACSIZE
dimension is significantly correlated with GOVOWN (r¼ 0.084) and with AUDQ dimension
(r¼ 0.287). The highest r of 0.454 is between GOVOWN and POLINF. However, both
variables’ presence in the models does not indicate a serious multicollinearity problem since
the absolute correlation magnitude is less than 0.8 (Gujarati, 1995). To address this concern
a separate regression is estimated by grouping the sample into above median and below
median groups.
6. Empirical results and discussions
6.1 Accounting conservatism, corporate governance and political influence
The result achieved by using the basic Basu (1997) model, modified by Roychowdhury and
Watts (2007) is reported in regression (1) in Table IV. It is consistent with the finding of
Vichitsarawong et al. (2010) in the post-Asian economic crisis period, in which the coefficient
on Dt,t−j×Rt,t−j (accounting conservatism) is positive and significant. This outcome
suggests that conditional conservatism exists in Malaysia. Regressions (2)-(5) in Table IV
present the results using Equation (2). Regressions (2), (3) and (4) include one political
influence measure in each regression since they proxy for the same construct. Regression (5)
includes both political influence measures into the regression model. Due to the concerns of
multicollinearity, regressions (2)-(5) and regressions in subsequent analyses report the
results based on the centering approach for interaction variables. The existence of
conditional conservatism, indicated by the coefficient ( β3), which captures or documents the
timelier recognition of bad news over good news, is consistently repeated to be significantly
positive in regressions (2)-(5). We also test the models by using un-centered interaction
variables and the results are materially similar to those reported in Table IV.
The results from regressions (2) and (3) reveal that the independence (INDEP) dimension
of corporate governance is significantly associated with accounting conservatism, but the
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board and audit committee size (BACSIZE) and audit quality (AUDQ) dimensions are not
significantly related to accounting conservatism. However, the coefficient on the board and
audit committee size dimension (BACSIZE) is negatively significant at 10 percent with
accounting conservatism in regression (5) and the coefficient on independence ceases to be
significant in regression (4). Consistent with LaFond and Roychowdhury (2008), the
proportion of management ownership (MAGTOWN) is negatively and significantly
associated with conditional conservatism in all regressions. The dimension of political
influence, as an aggregate measure, is not related to accounting conservatism. This outcome
leads to further tests using each of the political influence variables. As expected, Table IV
demonstrates the presence of more politically connected directors on the board (POLCON) is
significantly and negatively related to accounting conservatism but the proportion of
Bumiputera-Malays on company boards (MALDIR) is unrelated to conditional
conservatism. Regarding the relationship between accounting conservatism and
ownership structure, conditional conservatism has been found to be negatively and
significantly associated with the proportion of management ownership (MAGTOWN) in all
regressions which are consistent with the findings reported in LaFond and Roychowdhury
(2008). However, the percentage of government ownership (GOVOWN) is unrelated to
accounting conservatism.
Even though the aggregate measure of the political influence variables does not
demonstrate a significant result, the specific measures show more clear relationships. Our
finding supports the argument of resource dependency theory that having influential
leaders or resource providers on boards could influence firms’ decision making and financial
reporting. The results support the explanation of the “political view” that its influence can
be negative as evidenced by the significant negative coefficient for the proportion of
politically connected directors on a company board. Aggarwal (1999) and Chen et al. (2010)
argue that politically connected directors on a board enables a firm to gain access to
assistance, resources and contracts that have their origins in government directions and
political connections. Such easy access to resources provides less incentive for the
preparers to produce good quality reporting (Ball et al., 2003). Political influence proxied by
the proportion of Bumiputera-Malay directors on boards is unrelated to accounting
conservatism, suggesting government policies that favor some ethnicities do not influence
financial reports. Our result is consistent with the result in Johnson and Mitton (2003).
It has been shown there is no evidence that government-owned firms are more
conservative. A plausible reason for this is that the insignificant association between
government ownership and accounting conservatism is due to competing incentives
existing for government-owned firms in financial reporting. Some studies have argued that
government-owned firms play a key role in promoting the growth of a country, especially in
an emerging market (La Porta et al., 2002). As these firms are subject to greater public
pressure (La Porta et al., 2002), it is vital for these firms not to report aggressively.
The findings from Bushman and Piotroski (2006) reveal significant different directions of
influence of government ownership on accounting conservatism in Common Law countries
and Code Law countries. Further analysis is done by separating the sample into two
portfolios according to the median of government ownership, in order to examine the role of
politically connected directors on accounting conservatism (or in financial reporting).
Unlike the coefficient on government ownership, that on the interaction between
management ownership and accounting conservatism is negative and significant. It is
consistent with the findings reported in LaFond and Roychowdhury (2008) regarding the
US market. Even though agency conflicts in Malaysian listed firms are different to those
experienced by firms in developed countries (Liew, 2007), our results demonstrate that when
management and shareholders’ interests are more closely aligned, there is less demand for
conditional conservatism (LaFond and Roychowdhury, 2008) to mitigate agency conflicts.
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Our results support independence of board of directors and audit committee as the most
important governance mechanisms that ensure accounting conservatism. Independence is
essential in protecting stakeholders’ interests and ensuring financial integrity. The findings
from this research suggest that the steps taken by the Malaysian Government to adopt
Anglo-American corporate governance systems is generating some fruitful results on
accounting quality.
In general, the results do not show size and audit quality dimensions enhance the quality
of financial statements. The insignificant finding on size dimension is consistent with
Ahmed and Duellman’s (2007) study on accounting conservatism and a more recent one by
Dimitropoulos and Asteriou (2010) on earnings informativeness. Nevertheless, a smaller
board and audit committee size being potentially effective for accounting conservatism has
been found in regression (5), though the significance level is not strong. The results for the
audit quality dimension confirm the doubts raised by Favere-Marchesi (2000) and Ali et al.
(2006), who questioned the effectiveness and quality of audits conducted in Malaysia[15].
For brevity, the results on control variables are untabulated but are explained in texts.
With regard to control variables, the coefficient on MTB ratio is found to be negative but is
not significant in all regressions. Consistent with Givoly et al. (2007), our results show a
negative relationship between firm size and accounting conservatism in regression models
(2)-(5). A positive relationship between leverage and accounting conservatism is found in
regression models (2) and (3) due to more monitoring efforts being made by external
debt-holders as the debt-equity ratio increases.
6.2 Additional analysis: the moderating effect of political influence on the relationship
between corporate governance and conservatism
Further analysis is done by testing the moderating effect of political influence on the
relationship between corporate governance and conservatism. Since the previous analyses
reveal independent directors play an important role in accounting conservatism and the
ratio of politically connected directors has the negative effect on accounting conservatism,
we further investigate whether the interacting of these two factors also has an impact on
accounting conservatism. The other control variables in model (3) remain the same as in
previous models (defined in Section 4.2), including: board size, management ownership, firm
size, MTB ratio and leverage. The model (3) is as follows:
Ei;tj
Pt;tj1
¼ a0þb1Dt;tjþb2Rt;tjþb3Dt;tj  Rt;tjþb4INDEPi;t þb5INDEPi;t  Dt;tj
þ b6INDEPi;t  Rt;tj þb7INDEPi;t  Dt;tj  Rt;tjþb8POLCONi;t
þb9POLCONi;t  Dt;tjþb10POLCONi;t  Rt;tj
þb11POLCONi;t  Dt;t1  Rt;tjþb9INDEPi;t  POLCONi;t
þb10INDEPi;t  POLCONi;t  Dt;tjþb11INDEPi;t  POLCONi;t  Rt;tj
þb12INDEPi;t  POLCONi;t  Dt;t1  Rt;tjþ other control variablesð Þþe;
(3)
The results in Table V further confirm the effect on asymmetric timeliness as reported in the
main analysis. The results in Table V reveal consistent results that bad news are recognized
earlier than good news with the coefficient of D×R, 3.772 (t-statistic¼ 2.2.090). The results
indicate firms with better corporate governance are more conservative. The coefficient of
INDEP×D×R is 6.856 (t-statistic¼ 5.172) and firms with more politically connected
directors are rather less conservative and tend to delay the recognition of bad news with the
coefficient of POLICON×D×R is −0.899 (t-statistic¼−0.761).
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We also test the moderating roles played by political influence on the association between
corporate governance and conservatism by interacting the proportion of independent
directors on board (INDEP) and the proportion of politically connected directors on the
board (POLCON) and results are presented in Table V. It appears that political connection
has a negatively moderating effect as evidenced by the negative and significant coefficient
at the 5 percent level (coefficient INDEP×POLCON×D×R¼−3.533, t-statistic¼−2.154).
It shows that politically connected directors on board have weaken the effective role played
by independence directors. All other control variables are found significantly related to the
asymmetric timeliness recognition of gain and loss except for the management ownership.
In general, the results from additional analysis in Table V support the contention that
politically connected directors have a negative influence on the quality of financial
reporting, and affect the effectiveness of corporate governance mechanism as well.
6.3 Sensitivity analyses
We conducted sensitivity tests for the models estimated in Tables IV and V. The results of
these tests do not change the overall conclusions associated with corporate governance and
political influence. First, we re-estimated regressions (2), (3), (4) and (5) using panel estimated
generalized least squares (EGLS) fixed-effect models with t-statistics adjusted for panel
corrected standard errors to control for heteroscedasticity and serial correlation. The results
are quite similar to those in the main analysis as reported in Tables IV and V.
The independence dimension is strongly associated with accounting conservatism while
firms with politically connected directors are less conservative. Second, we added more
control variables such as cash flows and firms’ tax rates, which do not affect the overall
results. Third, we partitioned the firms with the proportion of politically connected directors
Dependent variable: income before extraordinary items divided by the market
value equity at the beginning of the period
(6)
Variables Coefficient t-statistic
Intercept 0.324 0.595
D −1.243 −1.218
R −0.592 −0.613
D×R 3.772** 2.090
INDEP 0.009 0.025
INDEP×D −0.151 −0.257
INDEP×R −0.044 −0.065
INDEP×D×R 6.856*** 5.172
POLCON −0.041 −0.104
POLCON×D −0.979 −1.571
POLCON×R −0.090 −0.139
POLCON×D×R −0.899** −0.761
INDEP×POLCON 0.276 0.450
INDEP×POLCON×D 0.791 0.809
INDEP×POLCON×R −0.161 −0.161
INDEP×POLCON×D×R −3.533** −2.154
Control variables Yes
n 824
Adjusted R2 0.204
F-statistic 7.301
Significance 0.000
Notes: All variables are defined in Table III. **,***Represent statistical significance at the 5 and 1 percent
levels, respectively (using two-tailed tests)
Table V.
Results of the
relationship between
asymmetric timeliness,
corporate governance,
political influence and
the moderating effect
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above or below the median. The evidence indicates firms with more politically connected
directors are more conservative than firms with less politically connected directors. We also
test models for endogenous problems following the approach suggested in Wooldridge
(2002). This process involves estimating traditional fixed-effect models augmented with
leading values of the potentially endogenous variables. Overall, the strict exogeneity test
reveals no evidence of an endogenous relationship between corporate governance and
political influence attributes with the firm-year accounting conservatism measure (detailed
results are not tabulated but are available on request).
6.4 The consequences of negative accounting conservatism due to political connections
In this paper, we have found that firms with more politically connected directors have
inferior earnings quality as measured by accounting conservatism. Studies have shown that
businesses with poor reporting standards suffer from a number of negative consequences
such as higher cost of capital, loss of reputation and a higher probability of litigation.
However, politically connected firms with poor quality financial information may not
actually suffer from these negative consequences. According to Chaney et al. (2011),
politically connected firms have strong ties with financing organizations and get
preferential treatment such as cheap loans. If these firms perform better the negative
consequence associated with poor financial reporting are ignored by market participants
( Johnson and Mitton, 2003). We regress firm performance on the proportion of politically
connected directors while controlling for accounting conservatism[16] and other governance
and control variables to investigate the relationship between firm performance and political
connection and conservatism. Since the likelihood ratio test shows OLS is unsatisfactory,
the following model is tested using panel EGLS fixed-effect specification:
ROAi;tþ 1 ¼ b0þb1POLCONitþb2BACSIZEitþb3INDEPitþb4AUDQit
þb5C_Scoreitþb6MALDIRitþb7MAGTOWNitþb8GOVOWNit
þb9CFOitþb10MTBitþb11FSIZEitþb12LEVit
þ
X
other control variablesð Þþeit (4)
where ROAi,t+1 is one year ahead earnings after tax divided by total assets. C_Scoreit is firm-
year measure of conservatism following Khan and Watts (2009). CFOit is cash flow from
operations divided by beginning total assets. All other variables have been defined. Since
the explanatory variables are one year lag to the dependent variable of the future
performance (ROA), only the data for the period 2005-2008 can be utilized. The regression
model is based on Haniffa and Hudaib (2006), where future performance is treated as a
function of previous year governance and control variables. Firms’ previous year
profitability and growth are controlled and the coefficients are expected to be positive
(Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; Fan et al., 2007). The regression also controls for leverage and a
negative relationship is expected between leverage and performance (Haniffa and Hudaib,
2006; Tam and Tan, 2007).
Based on 820 firm-year observations reported in Table VI, politically connected directors
bring more resources and competitive advantage to the firms through their linkages which
result in better future performance. The coefficient on politically connected directors is
found to be positive and significant, and consistent with Johnson and Mitton (2003). They
seem to perform better, despite the firms with more politically connected directors having
less conservative financial statements in earlier analyses using Basu’s (1997) model,
modified by Roychowdhury and Watts (2007), and indicating less good quality financial
statements. The finding provides some new evidence supporting Chaney et al.’s (2011)
argument that politically connected firms do not seem to suffer problems due to the poor
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quality of reporting. The percentages of Bumiputera-Malay directors and government
ownership are negatively associated with firms’ performance. It has been suggested that
Bumiputera-Malay directors still lag behind the other ethnic communities, and consequently
the inferior performance of Bumiputera-Malay directors is not surprising (Amran and
Susela, 2008; Zainol and Ayadurai, 2010). There is no evidence that management ownership
is related to firm performance, which is consistent with the finding in Wahab et al. (2007).
The results show conservatism scores are positively and significantly related to future
performance, which suggest that conservatism has predictive ability but the coefficient of
political connection is about four times larger which means that political connections
continue to dominate firm performance in Malaysia’s economy. Having politically connected
directors on company boards gives benefits to their firms such as allocation of subsidies and
other forms of government funding ( Johnson and Mitton, 2003). Political connections also
give firms more opportunities to access government controlled information, participate in
government projects which there will be fewer business uncertainties, for example, in terms
of payments and less likelihood of contract cancellation. Furthermore they will enjoy the
reduced transaction costs through government tax and fee exemptions (Hillman et al., 1999;
Faccio et al., 2006). The findings in this study indicate that good connections with politicians
outweigh the importance of the quality of financial information in relationship-based
economies. Consistent with Haniffa and Hudaib (2006), the coefficient on firm size is positive
but the coefficient on the independence dimension is not significant. All the control variables
are significant and in the direction as expected.
7. Conclusion
This paper investigates the impact of corporate governance, political connection and
ownership structure on accounting conservatism in Malaysia. Our findings are consistent
with prior studies showing that accounting conservatism is linked to stronger corporate
governance mechanisms (Beekes et al., 2004; Ahmed and Duellman, 2007; García Lara et al.,
2007, 2009; Ahmed and Henry, 2011) and that political influence adversely affects the
quality of financial reporting, as measured by accounting conservatism (Chaney et al., 2011).
Dependent variable: ROAt+1
Variable Coefficient t-statistic
C −3.721 −1.176
CSORE 1.140** 2.459
BACSIZE 0.690** 2.151
AUDQ −0.269 −0.643
INDEP −0.513 −1.264
POLCONR 4.129** 2.281
MALDIR −3.832*** −3.055
MAGTOWN 1.226 0.988
GOVOWN −0.038** −1.965
CFO 19.849*** 7.311
MTB 2.974*** 10.170
FSIZE 0.554** 2.273
LEV −9.671*** −5.182
Adjusted R2 0.362
F-statistic 25.407
n 824
Notes: Where ROAt+1 one year ahead return on asset, a proxy for performance. C_Score is the firm-year
measure of conservatism developed by Khan and Watts (2009). Other variables are defined in Table III.
**,***Represent statistical significance at the 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively (using two-tailed tests)
Table VI.
Results of relationship
between performance,
conservatism,
corporate governance
and political
connections
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We also find that while political connections lead to poorer quality financial reporting as
shown by less accounting conservatism despite strong corporate governance mechanisms
in place by firms, the negative consequences may not be severe. This is because politically
connected directors can bring more resources to their firms and thus do business better and
generally perform well. The findings in this study open avenues for further research to
clarify why political connection pays different roles in terms of enhancing accounting
quality and in terms of enhancing firm performance in Malaysia. Our results add to a
flourishing stream of empirical research on the topic of accounting conservatism, showing
that conditional conservatism is correlated with the strength of corporate governance.
However, the principal contribution of this analysis is to provide more direct evidence on the
effect of political influence on accounting conservatism. This paper provides support for the
view that corporate governance and political influence do influence the credibility of
financial reporting.
The practical implications of our study are twofold. First, a good corporate governance and
financial reporting environment stimulates capital market performance and greater investor
confidence, particularly for international investors. Our findings in this paper offer insights and
additional guidance for regulators and policy makers in emerging economies likeMalaysia who
are devising the relevant corporate governance and financial reporting frameworks. The
negative relationship between management ownership and accounting conservatism found in
this paper implies a reduced monitoring role of directors in firms owned by insiders
in Malaysia. Perhaps increasing the number of independent directors in closely owned firms
could help the board performmore effectively in monitoring the quality of financial statements.
Second, our finding of this paper does not support the appointment of politically
connected directors on a company’s board because it may compromise the quality of
financial statements from the perspective of accounting conservatism. However, opposing
the appointment of politically connected directors to a board cannot be easily done because
such an appointment is theoretically supported by resource dependency theory.
The appointment of influential community members on the board, such as politicians,
may provide benefits in terms of firm links and competitive advantage (Pfeffer and
Salancik, 1978). There is evidence for this not only in the emerging economies but also
within the confines of strong legal systems such as that in the USA (Goldman et al., 2009).
If this practice is pervasive, the information provided in this paper will alert regulators to be
cautious when appointing politically connected directors, particularly to audit committees
because an audit committee is more directly responsible for financial reporting tasks.
Notes
1. This term generally refers to both developing and transitional economies where institutional
underdevelopment (Ramamurti, 2003) and significant governmental or political involvement in
business affairs are hallmarks (Child and Tsai, 2005). China, Taiwan, Malaysia, India, Brazil and
Mexico are examples of emerging economies (Yamakawa et al., 2008).
2. Bumiputera literally means “son of the soil.” According to Rahman and Ali (2006), those with
cultural affinities indigenous to the region are classified as Malays or Bumiputeras, and those
whose cultural affinities lie outside the region are classified as non-Bumiputera (consisting
primarily of Chinese, Indians and others). This paper uses the term “Bumiputera-Malays” to refer
to people having Malay ethnicity, while acknowledging that about 5 percent of the population are
classified as Bumiputera even though they are non-Malays (such as the indigenous communities
in Sabah and Sarawak).
3. Rajan and Zingales (1998) describe East Asian financial institutions as relationship-based
systems. According to Li (2003), most transactions in this system are based on personal, implicit
agreements, local information and partial contracts enforceable by the state. These are the norms
of most economies during the catching-up stage (Li, 2003).
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4. This approach is consistent with LaFond and Roychowdhury (2008) who use only Basu’s (1997)
conditional conservatism as a primary measure of accounting conservatism. The terms
“accounting conservatism” and “conditional conservatism” are used interchangeably in this
paper, and they refer to the asymmetric timeliness of earnings (Basu, 1997).
5. With the launch of the National Economic Policy (NEP) in 1971, and later the National
Development Policy (NDP) in 1991, the government enforced positive discrimination among the
Bumiputeras. At that time, 40 percent of Malaysia’s population (made up of Chinese and Indians)
controlled over 80 percent of the country’s wealth ( Jesudason, 1989). This policy indeed enhances
the level of ownership by Bumiputera-Malays in the capital markets.
6. Bursa Malaysia was previously known as the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE).
7. Ball and Shivakumar (2005) explain that unconditional conservatism gives rise to a poor match
between economic costs and benefits, and creates a fixed bias in accounting. It is therefore
unlikely to facilitate either the valuation or contracting roles of accounting.
8. The “Big Four” auditors consist of a group of leading international accounting firms. Before the
collapse of Arthur Andersen in 2002, this group was known as the Big Five or Big Six. The “Big
Four” auditing firms are Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, Ernst & Young, KPMG, and
PricewaterhouseCoopers.
9. We did not include 2008 because of the Global Financial Crisis which saw government
interventions in corporate affairs and monitoring of what was happening in the country. Also the
Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance was revised on October 1, 2007 (see www.
bursamalaysia.com), which is not expected to affect the sample.
10. In 1997, the Malaysian Accounting Standards Board (MASB) was established to issue legally
binding accounting standards known as MASBs.
11. Dietrich et al. (2007) discuss the limitations of Basu’s (1997) approach to estimating asymmetric
timeliness as yielding bias when earnings information affects returns. However, Ryan (2006)
contends that the measurement error of this model is likely to be small.
12. The firms under direct government control and Government-Linked Investment Companies
(GLICs), some of which are as mentioned before, are termed Government Linked Companies
(GLCs) (see www.pcg.gov.my).
13. This approach, sample size and number of variables are comparable with 747 firm-year
observations in Ahmed and Duellman (2007). The sample size in this study is 824 firm-year
observations.
14. VIF of more than 10 indicates harmful collinearity (Neter et al., 1983).
15. The lack of incentives for statutory auditors to provide quality audit services is perhaps one of
the factors affecting audit quality (Favere-Marchesi, 2000). Ali et al. (2006) contend that auditing
in Malaysia is done merely to fulfill the legal requirements and provide an “image” of a modern
economy in order to attract investment from overseas investors, rather than to address the needs
of its own social environment. They also contend that the existence of a strong relationship
between corporate elites and political leaders has weakened if not compromised the modern
auditing infrastructure.
16. In this case, a firm-year measure of conservatism is needed as an independent variable, therefore
C_Score (Khan and Watts, 2009) is used in the regression model.
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